The long-standing byzantine agreement problem gets more attention in recent years due to the increasing demand for scalable geo-replicated Byzantine state machine replication (SMR) systems (e.g., Blockchains). To date, the key bottleneck of such systems is the communication cost of the byzantine agreement they employ as a building block, which motivates many researchers to search for low-communication byzantine agreement protocols. The conventional approach is to design deterministic protocols in the eventually synchronous communication model that are optimized to reduce the communication cost after the global stabilization time (GST).
all-to-all communication in each view of the PBFT [8] protocol. HotStuff [26] leverages ideas in Tendermint [4] to propose a linear view-change mechanism, and Naor et al. [22] propose an algorithm to synchronize parties between views with a linear cost after GST in failure-free runs. However, none of these algorithms bounds the number of views executed before GST, and thus none of them bounds its communication cost in the worst case scenario.
We claim in this paper that agreement algorithms designed for the eventually synchronous model are not the best fit for scalable SMR systems. That is, ensuring linear communication cost after GST worth nothing to the overall SMR performance if it requires a possibility unbounded communication beforehand.
Contribution
Vulnerability of the eventually synchronous model. In our first contribution we prove the following lower bound that captures the inherent vulnerability of algorithms designed in the eventually synchronous communication model:
There is no eventually synchronous deterministic byzantine agreement protocol with a bounded communication cost before GST even in failure-free runs.
Noval approach. Eventually synchronous communication models capture arbitrarily long asynchronous periods that are followed by "long enough" synchronous periods. So algorithms in this model are designed to provide progress with a small communication cost during synchronous periods, but might be forced to pay unbounded cost to tolerate the asynchronous periods. We propose a new approach that forgo the eventually synchronous assumptions. Specifically, we optimistically consider all runs as synchronous and then treat all non-synchronous runs as asynchronous.
Our goal in this paper is to develop an optimistic protocol that adapts to network conditions and failures to guarantee termination with an optimal communication cost under all scenarios. To this end, our optimistic protocol first runs an efficient synchronous algorithm, which guarantees termination in synchronous runs with an optimal communication cost. Then, in case the run is not synchronous, our protocol uses an asynchronous algorithm for fallback. The idea behind this approach is to move to the asynchronous fallback only after paying an equivalent communication cost to that of the fallback algorithm, in which case there is no point to wait for synchrony in a hope for a low cost.
Lower and upper boubnds for adaptive synchronous byzantine agreement. Dolev and Reischuk [10] prove that there is no deterministic protocol that solves synchronous byzantine agreement with less than O(t 2 ) communication cost, where t is the failure threshold. We generalize their result for runs with f ≤ t failures and prove the following lower bound: Theorem 2. Any synchronous deterministic byzantine agreement protocol has a communication cost of Ω(f t + t).
Our first positive result is an asymptotically tight upper bound -we present a synchronous protocol with communication cost of O(f t + t) that stops after O(n) rounds in the worst case and guarantees early decision after O(f + 1) rounds. The question of early decision/stopping is a classical problem in distributed computing [1, 11, 13, 16 ]. Due to [11] and [16] no protocol can decide or stop in less than f + 2 rounds and the protocols in [1, 13] showed how to achieve optimal early decision and stopping with a polynomial communication cost in the full information model.
To the best of our knowledge, our protocol is the first to use cryptography to achieve asymptotically optimal communication cost and early decision. Our protocol does not provide early stopping, but we argue that optimal communication complexity and early decision are favorable for scalable SMR systems. That is, parties move to the next slot once they decide in the current one and the overall system throughput is determined by the communication cost of the agreement protocol in every slot and not by the time the last message is sent.
Optimal optimistic byzantine agreement. Our main contribution is an optimistic byzantine agreement protocol with an asymptotically optimal communication cost under all network conditions and failure scenarios. Our protocol guarantees termination in all synchronous runs with a communication cost of O(f t +t), and in all other runs it provides termination with probability 1 with a communication cost of O(t 2 ) in expectation. The protocol combines a synchronous part with an asynchronous fallback, where for the synchronous part we use our optimal synchronous algorithm and for the fallback we use a variant of the optimal asynchronous byzantine agreement of VABA [2] .
The first challenge in combining both parts is to make sure that parties do not move to the more expensive asynchronous part (fallback) unless necessary for termination, while not paying more than O(f t + t) in synchronous runs. The difficulty here is twofold: first, parties cannot always distinguish between synchronous and asynchronous runs. Second, they cannot distinguish between honest parties that complain that they did not decide (due to asynchrony) in the first part and byzantine parties that complain because they wish to increase the communication cost by moving to the asynchronous fallback. To deal with this challenge, we implement a Help&tryHalting procedure in which parties try to avoid the fallback part by helping complaining parties learn the decision value and move to the fallback only when the number of complaints indicates that the run is not synchronous. This way, each byzantine party in a synchronous run cannot increase the communication cost by more than O(n) = O(t), where n is the total number of parties.
The second challenge in the optimistic protocol is to combine both parts in a way that guarantees safely. That is, since some parties may decide in the synchronous part and others in the asynchronous fallback, we need to make sure they decide on the same value. To this end, we use the leader-based view (LBV) abstraction, defined in [25] , as a building block for both parts. The LBV abstraction captures a single view in a view-by-view agreement protocol such that one of its important properties is that a sequential composition of them preserves safety. For optimal communication cost, we adopt techniques from [26] and [2] to implement the LBV abstraction with an asymptotically linear cost (O(n)).
Our synchronous protocol operates up to n sequentially composed pre-defined linear LBV instances, each with a different leader. In order to achieve optimal (adaptive to the number of actual failures) cost, leaders invoke their LBVs only if they have not yet decided. In contrast to eventually synchronous protocols, the synchronous part is designed to provide termination only in synchronous runs. Therefore, parties do not need to be synchronized before views, but rather move from one LBV to the next in pre-defined times. As for the asynchronous fallback, we use the linear LBV building block to reconstruct the VABA [2] protocol in a way that forms a sequential composition of LBVs, which in turn allows a straight-forward sequential composition with the synchronous part.
In summary, the paper makes the following contributions:
• We prove that no deterministic byzantine agreement protocol can bound its communication cost before GST in eventually synchronous runs even in the failure-free case.
• We propose a new approach to design agreement protocols for practical SMR systems that forgo eventual synchrony.
• We prove that the communication cost of any deterministic byzantine agreement protocol is at least O(f t + t) even in synchronous runs.
• We present the first deterministic synchronous byzantine agreement protocol with an asymptotically optimal communication complexity of O(f t + t).
• We present the first optimistic byzantine agreement protocol that guarantee termination in all synchronous runs with optimal communication cost and provide termination with probability 1 with a cost of O(t 2 ), in expectation, in all non-synchronous runs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we define our model. Then, in section 3 we prove our lower bounds and in Section 4 we present our algorithms. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude and discuss future directions.
MODEL
As previous practical solutions [3, 8, 15, 19, 21, 26] , we consider a byzantine message passing peer to peer model with a set Π of n parties and a computationally bounded adversary that corrupts up to t < n/3 of them. Parties corrupted by the adversary are called byzantine and may arbitrary deviate from the protocol. Other parties are honest.
Communication and runs. We assume a global clock, visible to all parties, that perfectly measures time and a known to all parameter ∆. The communication links are reliable but controlled by the adversary, i.e., all messages sent among honest parties are eventually delivered, but the adversary controls the delivery time. A run of a protocol is eventually synchronous if there is a global stabilization time (GST) after which all message sent among honest parties are delivered within a ∆ time. A run is synchronous if GST occurs at time 0, and asynchronous if GST never occurs.
The Agreement problem. The Agreement problem exposes an API to propose a value and to output a decision from some domain V. We are interested in protocols that never compromise safety and thus require the following property to be satisfied in all runs:
• Agreement: All honest parties that decide, decide on the same value.
Due to the FLP result [12] , no deterministic agreement protocol can provide safety and liveness properties in all asynchronous runs. Therefore, in this paper we consider protocols that guarantee (deterministic) termination in all synchronous and eventually synchronous runs, and provides a probabilistic termination in asynchronous ones:
• Termination: All honest parties eventually decide.
• Probabilistic-Termination: All honest parties decide with probability 1.
As for validity, for the lower bounds, in order to strengthen them as much as possible, we consider the binary case, which is the weakest possible definition. For the upper bounds, we are interested in practical multi-valued protocols and thus consider the external validity property [5, 6] , which is implicitly or explicitly considered in most practical byzantine agreement solutions we are aware of [2, 8, 15, 19, 26] . Intuitively, with external validity, parties are allowed to decide on a value proposed by any party (honest and byzantine) as long as it is valid by some external predict. To capture the above and rule out trivial solutions such as simply deciding on some pre-defined externally valid value, we give a formal definition below. In both validity properties, honest parties decide only on values from V.
• Binary validity: The domain of valid values V = {0, 1}, and if all honest parties propose the same value v ∈ V, than no honest party decides on a value other than v.
• External validity: The domain of valid values V is unknown to honest parties. In the beginning of every run, each honest party gets a value v with a proof σ that v ∈ V such that all other honest parties can verify.
We define an optimistic Agreement protocol to be a protocol that guarantees Agreement and External validity in all runs, Termination in all synchronous and eventually synchronous runs, and Probabilistic-Termination in asynchronous runs.
Cryptographic assumptions. We assume a computationally bounded adversary and a trusted dealer that equips parties with cryptographic schemes. For simplicity of presentation and in order to avoid the analysis of security parameters and negligible error probabilities, we assume that the following cryptographic tools are perfect:
• Authenticated link. If an honest party p i delivers a messages m from an honest party p j , then p j previously sent m to p i . • Threshold signatures scheme. We assume that each party p i has a private function share-sign i , and we assume 3 public functions: share-validate, threshold-sign, and threshold-validate. Informally, given "enough" valid shares, the function threshold-sign returns a valid threshold signature. For our algorithm, we sometimes require "enough" to be t + 1 and sometimes n − t. A formal definition can be found in [2] .
Communication complexity. We denote by f the actual number of corrupted parties in a given run and we are interested in optimistic Agreement protocols that utilize f and the network condition to reduce communication cost.
Similarly to [2] , we say that a word can contain a constant number of signatures and values, and each message contains 
LOWER BOUNDS
In this section we present two lower bounds on the communication complexity of deterministic byzantine agreement protocols in synchronous and eventually synchronous runs.
Eventually synchronous runs.
The following theorem exemplifies the inherent vulnerability of the eventually synchronous approach. Theorem 1. There is no deterministic byzantine agreement algorithm with bounded eventually synchronous communication cost even in failure-free runs.
Proof. Assume by a way of contradiction that there are such algorithms. Let A be such algorithm with the best eventually synchronous communication cost with 0 failures, and denote its communication cost by N . Clearly, N ≥ 1.
Let R N ⊂ R es 0 be the set of all failure-free eventually synchronous runs of A that have communication cost of N . For every run r ∈ R N let m r be the last message that is delivered in r , let t r be the time at which it is delivered, and let p r be the party that sends m r . Now for every r ∈ R N consider a run r ′ that is identical to r up to time t r except p r is byzantine that acts exactly as in r but does not send m r . Denote by R N −1 the set of all such runs and consider two cases:
• There is a run r ′ ∈ R N −1 in which a message m by an honest party p is sent after time t r . Now consider a failurefree run r ′′ that is identical to run r except the delivery of m is delayed. The runs r ′′ and r ′ are indistinguishable to all parties that are honest in r ′ and thus some honest party send a message after time t r in r ′′ as well. Therefore, the communication cost of r ′′ is at least N + 1. A contradiction to the communication cost of A.
• Otherwise, we can construct an algorithm A ′ with a better eventually synchronous communication cost with 0 failures than A in the following way: A ′ operates identically to A in all runs not in R N and for every run r ∈ R N A ′ operates as A except p r does not send m r . A contradiction to the definition of A. 
Synchronous runs.
We next prove a lower bound that applies even to synchronous byzantine agreement algorithms and is adaptive to the number of actual failures f . The proof is a generalization of the proof in [10] , which was originally proved for the byzantine broadcast problem and considered the worst case scenario (f = t).
The proof of the following Claim is straight forward and for space limitation is deferred to Appendix A. Claim 1. The synchronous communication cost with 0 failures of any byzantine agreement algorithm is at least t.
The following Lemma shows that if honest parties send less than O(f t) messages, then byzantine parties can prevent honest parties from getting any of them. Lemma 1 . Assume that there is a byzantine agreement algorithm A, which synchronous communication cost with f failures is less than O(f t) for some 1 ≤ f ≤ ⌊t/2⌋. Then, for every set S ⊂ Π of f parties and for every set of values proposed by honest parties, there is a synchronous run r ′ s.t. some honest party p ∈ S does not get any messages in r ′ .
Proof. Let r ∈ R s f be a run in which all parties in S are byzantine that ignore all messages they receive and act like honest parties that get no messages. By the assumption, there is a party p ∈ S that receives less than t/2 messages in r .
Denote the set of parties outside S that send messages to p in r by P ⊂ Π \ S and consider the following run r ′ :
• Parties in S \ {p} are byzantine that act like in r .
• Parties in P are byzantine. They do not send messages to p, but other than that act as honest parties.
• All other parties, including p, are honest.
First, note that the number of byzantine parties in r
Also, since p acts in r as an honest party that do not receive messages, and all byzantine parties in r ′ act towards honest parties in r ′ (Π \ (S ∪ P)) in exactly the same way as they do in r , then honest parties in r ′ cannot distinguish between r and r ′ . Thus, since they do not send messages to p in r they do not send in r ′ as well. Therefore, p does not get any message in r ′ . □
The next Lemma uses the previous one to show that parties that do not get messages cannot safely decide.
Lemma 2.
For any 1 ≤ f ≤ ⌊t/2⌋, there is no optimistic byzantine agreement algorithm which synchronous communication cost with f failures is less than O(f t).
Proof. Assume by a way of contradiction such protocol A which synchronous communication cost with f failures is less than O(f t) for some 1 ≤ f ≤ ⌊t/2⌋ and pick a set of S 1 ⊂ Π of f parties. By Lemma 1, there is a run r 1 of A s.t. some honest party p 1 ∈ S does not get any messages regardless of the values honest parties propose. Now let Lemma 1 again, there is a run r 2 of A s.t. some party p 2 p 1 does not get any messages regardless of the values honest parties propose. Since f ≤ ⌊t/2⌋, we can repeat the above 2t + 1 times and get that for every possible input (values proposed by honest parties) there is a set T of 2t + 1 parties s.t. for every party p ∈ T there is a run of A in which p is honest and does not get any messages. In particular, there exist such set T 0 for the case in which all honest party propose 0 and a set T 1 for the case in which all honest parties propose 1. Since |T 0 | = |T 1 | = 2t + 1, there is a party p ∈ T 1 ∩ T 2 . Therefore, by the Termination and Binary validity properties, there is a run r in which p does not get any messages and decides 0 and a run r ′ in which p does not any messages and decides 1.
However, since r and r ′ are indistinguishable to p we get a contradiction. □
The following Theorem follows directly from Lemma 2 and Claim 1.
Theorem 2. Any synchronous deterministic byzantine agreement protocol has a communication cost of Ω(f t + t).
ASYMPTOTICALLY OPTIMAL OPTIMISTIC BYZANTINE AGREEMENT
In this section we present our optimistic byzantine agreement protocol, which synchrnous communication cost is tight to the lower bounds proven in Theorem 2. In a nutshell, our protocol safely combines a linear adaptive to failures approach that relies on synchrony for termination with a quadratic asynchronous fallback. For the ease of exposition, we construct our protocol in steps. First, in Section 4.1, we present the local state each party maintains and describe the linear leader-based view (linear LBV) building block, which is used by both parts of the protocol. Then, in Section 4.2, we describe a synchronous protocol, which communication complexity is asymptotically optimal in the failure threshold t and the number of actual failures f . Next, in Section 4.3, we show how the optimal quadratic asynchronous byzantine agreement protocol of [2] can be reconstructed by using the linear LBV building blocks. Finally, in section 4.4, we show how to safely combine both protocols (synchronous and asynchronous) to get an optimistic protocol that achieves an asymptotically optimal communication complexity under all network conditions and failure scenarios. A formal correctness proof of the protocol appears in Appendix B.
General structure
The protocol uses many instances of the linear LBV building block, each of which is parametrized with a sequence number and a leader. Each party in the protocol maintains a local state, which is used by all LBVs and is updated according to their returned values. and an illustration appears in figure 1 . The linear LBV building block supports an API to start the view and wedge the view. Upon a startView(⟨sq, p l ⟩) invocation, the invoking party starts processing messages associated with the linear LBV that is parametrized with sequence number sq and a leader p l . When the leader p l invokes startView(⟨sq, p l ⟩) it initiates 3.5 steps of leader-to-all and all-to-leader communication. In each of the first 3 steps, the leader sends its VALUE together with a threshold signature that proves the safety of the value for the current step and then waits to collect n − f valid replies. A party that gets a message from the leader validates that the received value and proof are valid for the current step, then produces its signature share on a message that contains the value and the current step's name, and sends the share back to the leader. When the leader gets n − t valid shares, it combines them into a threshold signature and continues to the next step. After successfully generating the threshold signature at the end of the third step, the leader has a commit certificate which he sends together with its VALUE to all parties.
Algorithm 2 A linear LBV instance parametrized with sq and leader : API for a party p i .
Local variables initialization:
return ⟨keyProof, lockProof, commitProof⟩ 4: upon startView(sq, leader) invocation do 5: start processing received messages associated with sq and leader 6:
if leader = p i then 7: **//first step//** 8:
send "preKeyStep, sq, l eader , VALUE, KEY" to all parties 9:
wait until |S key | = n − t 10:
ν k ← threshold-sign(S key ) 11: **//second step//** 12:
send "KeyStep, sq, l eader , VALUE, ν k " to all parties 13:
wait until |S lock | = n − t 14: ν l ← threshold-sign(S lock ) 15: **//third step//** 16:
send "lockStep, sq, l eader , VALUE, ν l " to all parties 17:
wait until |S commit | = n − t 18: ν c ← threshold-sign(S commit ) 19: **//broadcast the commit//** 20:
send "commit, sq, l eader , VALUE, ν c " to all parties 21:
wait for done = true 22:
return ⟨keyProof, lockProof, commitProof⟩
In addition to validating and share signing messages, parties also store the values and proofs they receive. The keyProof and lockProof variables store a tuple consisting of the value and the threshold signature received from the leader in the second and third steps, respectively, and commitProof stores the received value and the commit certificate. Whenever a party receives a valid commit certificate from the leader it returns its keyProof, lockProof, and commitProof, which are then used by the high level agreement protocol to update the LOCK, KEY, VALUE, and COMMIT variables in the local state.
As for the validation of the leader's messages, parties distinguish between the first step message from the rest. In second step, third step, and commit certificate messages, parties simply check that the attached proof is a valid threshold signature on a message that contains the leader's value and the previous step name of the current linear LBV instance.
The first step message, however, is what links sequentially composed LBV instances. To develop intuition, let us first present the properties guaranteed by a single linear LBV instance:
• Commit causality: If a party gets a valid commit certificate, then at least t + 1 honest parties previously got a valid lockProof. • Lock causality: If a party gets a valid lockProof, then at least t +1 honest parties previously got a valid keyProof.
• Safety: All valid keyProof, lockProof, and commit certificates obtained in the LBV have the same value. if active ∧ (LOCK = ⊥ ∨ key.sq ≥ LOCK) then ▷ key is up-to-date 3:
if key = ⊥ ∨ threshold-validate( ⟨preKeyStep, key.sq, LEADERS[key.sq], value⟩, key.proof)) then ▷ key is valid 4:
ρ k ← share-sign i ( ⟨preKeyStep, sq, leader, value⟩) 5:
send "keyShare, sq, l eader , ρ k " to leader 6: upon receiving "keyShare, sq, l eader , ρ k " from party p j for the first time do 7: if l eader = p i ∧ share-validate( ⟨preKeyStep, sq, leader, VALUE⟩, p j , ρ k ) then ▷ ρ k is p j 's valid key share 8:
S key ← S key ∪ ρ k 9: upon receiving "KeyStep, sq, leader, value, ν k " from leader do 10:
if active ∧ threshold-validate( ⟨preKeyStep, sq, leader, value⟩, ν k ) then 11:
keyProof ← ⟨value, ν k ⟩ 12:
ρ l ← share-sign i ( ⟨KeyStep, sq, leader, value⟩) 13:
send "lockShare, sq, l eader , ρ l " to leader checking the key's sequence number sq, that the attached key was obtained in an LBV instance that does not precede the one the party is locked on (the sequence number that is stored in the party's LOCK variable). Then, the party checks that the threshold signature in the key is a valid signature (1) on a message that contains the leader's value; and (2) was generated at the end of the first step (a valid keyProof) of the LBV instance that is parametrized with sq and LEADERS [sk] . Note that if the party is not locked (LOCK = ⊥) than a key is not required.
In order to be able to abandon an LBV instance with a byzantine leader that do not drive progress, parties use the In a nutshell, a sequential composition of LBVs operates as follows: parties start an LBV instance by invoking startView and at some later time (depends on the approach) invoke wedgeView and update their local states with the returned values. Then, they exchange messages to propagate information (e.g., up-to-date keys or commit certificates), update their local states again and start the next LBV. We claim that a high-level agreement protocol that sequentially composes several linear LBV instances and maintains the local state in Algorithm 1 has the following properties:
• Agreement: all commit certificates in all LBV instances have the same value.
• Conditional progress: for every LBV instance, if the leader is honest, all honest parties invoke startView, and all messages among honest parties are delivered before some honest party invokes wedgeView, then all honest parties get a commit certificate.
Intuitively, by the commit causality property of the linear LVB, if some party returns a valid commit certificate (commitProof) with a value v in some LBV instance with sequence number sq, then at least t + 1 honest parties return a valid lockProof and thus lock on sq (LOCK ← sq). Therefore, since the leader of the next LBV needs the cooperation of n − t parties in order to generate threshold signatures, its first step's message must include a valid keyProof that was obtained in the LBV instance with sequence number sq. By the safety property of the linear LBV, this keyProof includes the value v and thus v is the only value the leader can propose. The agreement property follows by induction.
As for conditional progress, we have to make sure that honest leaders are able to drive progress. Thus, we must ensure that all honest leaders have the most up-to-date keys. By the lock causality property, if some party gets a valid lockProof in some LBV, then at least t + 1 honest parties get a valid keyProof in this LBV and thus are able to unlock all honest parties in the next LBV. Therefore, leaders can get the up-to-date key by querying a quorum of n − t parties.
From the above, a byzantine agreement protocol can satisfy Agreement by sequentially composing LBVs. The challenge, which we address in the rest of this section, is how to sequentially compose LBVs in a way that satisfies Termination with asymptotically optimal communication complexity under all network conditions and failure scenarios.
Adaptive to failures synchronous protocol
In this section we describe a synchronous byzantine agreement protocol with an asymptotically optimal adaptive communication cost. Namely, the communication complexity of the protocol is O(f t + t), which is tight to the lower bound proven in Theorem 2. A detailed pseudocode is given in Algorithms 4 and 5, and an illustration appears in figure 2.
Algorithm 4 Adaptive synchronous protocol: Procedure for a party p i .
tryOptimistic() 4: procedure tryOptimistic() 5: trySynchrony(1, p 1 , 7´) 6:
for j ← 2 to n do 7:
if i j then 8:
trySynchrony(j, p j , 9´) 9:
else if COMMIT = ⊥ then 10:
send "keyReqest" to all parties 11:
wait for 2∆ time 12: trySynchrony(j, p j , 7´) 13 : procedure trySynchrony(sq, l eader , T ) 14: invoke startView(sq, leader) ▷ non-blocking invocation 15:
wait for T time 16: ⟨keyProof, lockProof, commitProof⟩ ← wedgeView(sq, leader) 17:
updateState(sq, leader, keyProof, lockProof, commitProof)
18: upon receiving "keyReqest" from party p k for the first time do 19: send "keyReply, KEY, VALUE" to party p k 20: upon receiving "keyReply, key, value" do 21: check&updateKey(key, value)
The protocol sequentially composes n pre-defined linear LBV instances, each with a different leader, and parties decide whenever they get a commit certificate in one of them. To exploit synchrony, parties in the protocol use the shared global clock to coordinate their actions -meaning that all the startView and wedgeView invocation times are predefined in a way that allows honest leaders to provide conditional progress, e.g., the first LBV starts at time 0 and is wedged at time 7∆. In addition, to make sure honest leaders can drive progress, each leader (except the first) learns the up-to-date key, before invoking startView, by querying all parties and waiting for a quorum of n − t parties to reply. Termination and communication complexity. A naive approach to guarantee termination and avoid an infinite number of LBV instances in a leader based byzantine agreement protocols is to perform a costly communication phase after each LBV instance. One common approach is to reliably broadcast commit certificates before halting, while a complementary one is to halt unless receiving a quorum of complaints from parties that did not decide. In both cases, the communication cost is O(t 2 ) even in runs with at most one failure.
The key idea of our protocol is to exploit synchrony in order to allow honest parties to learn the decision value and at the same time help others in a small number of messages. Instead of complaining (together) after every unsuccessful LBV instance, each party has its own pre-defined time to "complain", in which it learns the up-to-date key and value and helps others decide via the LBV instance in which it acts as the leader.
By the conditional progress property and the synchrony assumption, all honest parties get a commit certificate in LBV instances with honest leaders. Therefore, the termination property is guaranteed since every honest party has its own pre-defined LBV instance, which it invokes in case it has not yet decided. As for the protocol's total communication cost, recall that the LBV's communication cost is O(t) in the worst case and 0 in case the leader is honest that decides not to participate since it has already decided. In addition, since all honest parties get a commit certificate in the first LBV instance with an honest leader, we get that the message cost of all later LBV instances with honest leaders is 0.
Therefore, the total communication cost of the protocol is O(f t + t) words -at most f LBVs with byzantine leaders and 1 LBV with an honest one that cost O(t) words each.
Algorithm 5 Auxiliary procedures to update local state. COMMIT ← commit 20:
decide COMMIT.val
Asynchronous fallback
In this section we follow the framework of [25] and use the linear LBV building block to reconstruct a variant of the optimal asynchronous byzantine agreement protocol of VABA [2] . Note that achieving an optimal asynchronous protocol is not a contribution of this paper but reconstructing the VABA protocol with our linear LBV building block allows us to safely combine it with our adaptive synchronous protocol to achieve an optimal optimistic one. In addition, we also improve the protocol of VABA in the following ways: First, parties in VABA [2] never halt, meaning that even though they decide in expectation in a constant number of waves (rounds), they operate an unbounded number of them.
We fix it by adding an auxiliary primitive, we cal help&tryHalting, in between two consecutive waves. Second, the VABA protocol guarantees probabilistic termination in all runs, whereas our version also guarantees standard termination in eventually synchronous runs. The full detailed pseudocode of our protocol appears in Algorithms 5, 6, 9, and 7.
On a high level, the idea in VABA [2] that was later generalized in [25] is the following: instead of having a pre-defined leader in every "round" of the protocol as most eventually synchronous protocols and our synchronous protocol have, they let n leaders operate simultaneously and then randomly choose one in retrospect. This mechanism is implemented inside a wave and the agreement protocol operates in a wave-by-wave manner s.t. parties exchange their local states between every two conductive waves. To ensure halting, in our version of the protocol, parties also invoke the help&tryHalting procedure after each wave. See the tryPessimistic procedure in Algorithm 6 for pseudocode (ignore gray lines at this point) and Figure 3 for an illustration.
Algorithm 6 Asynchronous fallback: Protocol for a party p i .
fallback (1) 4: procedure fallback(sq ini t ) 5: RRleader ← 1 6: sq ← sq ini t 7:
while true do 8:
wave(sq) 9: exchangeState(sq) 10: help&tryHalting(sq) 11: trySynchrony(sq + 1, RRl eader , 8∆) 12: exchangeState(sq+1) 13: help&tryHalting(sq + 1) 14:
RRleader ← RRleader + 1 mod |Π | 15: sq ← sq + 2 16 : upon startView(sq, p j ) returns do 17: send "your-view-done, sq" to party p j 18: procedure wave(sq) 19 : for all p j = p 1 , . . . , p n do 20:
invoke startView(sq, p j ) ▷ non-blocking invocation 21: barrier-sync(sq) ▷ blocking 22:
leader ← elect(sq) 23: ⟨keyProof, lockProof, commitProof⟩ ← wedgeView(sq, leader) 24: updateState(sq, leader, keyProof, lockProof, commitProof)
25: upon receiving n − t "your-view-done, sq" messages do 26: invoke barrier-ready(sq) ▷ note that n − t parties must invoke it for barrier-sync(sq) to return 27: procedure exchangeState(sq) 28:
send "exchange, sq, KEY, VALUE, COMMIT" to all parties 29:
wait for n−t "exchange, sq, * , * " messages from different parties 30: upon receiving "exchange, sq, key, value, commit" do 31: check&updateKey(key, value) 32: check&updateCommit(commit) Fig. 3 . Asynchronous fallback. Usig linear LBV to reconstruct the VABA [2] protocol.
Wave-by-wave approach. To implement the wave mechanism (Algorithm 6) we use our linear LBV and two auxiliary primitives: Leader election and Barrier synchronization (Algorithm 7). At the beginning of every wave, parties invoke, via startView, n different LBV instances, each with a different leader. Then, parties are blocked in the Barrier synchronization primitive until at least n − 2t LBV instances complete. (An LBV completes when t + 1 honest parties get a commit certificate.) Finally, parties use the Leader election primitive to elect a unique LBV instance, wedge it (via wadgeView), and ignore the rest. With a probability of 1/3 parties choose a completed LBV, which guarantees that after the state exchange phase all honest parties get a commit certificate, decide, and halt in the help&tryHalting procedure. Otherwise, parties update their local state and continue to the next wave. An illustration appears in figure 4 .
Since every wave has a probability of 1/3 to choose a completed LBV instance, the protocol guarantees probabilistic termination -in expectation, all honest parties decide after 3 waves. In order to also satisfy standard termination in eventually synchronous runs, we "try synchrony" after each not successful wave. See the gray lines in Algorithm 6.
Between every two conjunctive waves parties deterministically try to commit a value in a pre-defined LBV instance. The preceding help&tryHalting procedure guarantees that after GST all honest parties invoke startView in the pre-defined LBV instance with at most 1∆ from each other and thus setting a timeout to 8∆ is enough for an honest leader to drive Fig. 4 . An illustration of a single wave. The returned keyProof, lockProof, and commitProof are taken from the elected LBV.
Algorithm 7 Barrier synchronization and Leader-election: protocol for a party p i .
Local variables for Barrier synchronization: 1: S barrier ← { }; READY ← false 2: procedure barrier-sync(sq) 3:
wait until READY = true 4: procedure barrier-ready(sq) 5: ρ ← share-sign i ( ⟨shareReady, sq ⟩) 6: send "shareReady, sq, ρ" to all parties 7: upon receiving "shareReady, sq, ρ" from a party p j do 8:
if share-validate( ⟨shareReady, sq ⟩, p j , ρ) then 9:
S barrier ← S barrier ∪ {ρ } 10:
if |S barrier | = n − t then 11:
ν ← threshold-sign(S barrierReady ) 12:
send "barrierReady, sq, ν " to all parties 13: upon receiving "barrierReady, sq, ν " do 14:
if threshold-validate( ⟨barrierReady, sq ⟩, ν ) then 15:
send "barrierReady, sq, ν " to all parties 16:
READY ← true
Local variables for Leader election: 17: S coin ← { } 18: procedure elect(sq) 19: ρ ← share-sign i (sq) 20: send "coinShare, sq, ρ" to all parties 21:
wait until |S coin | = t + 1 22: ν ← threshold-sign(S coin ) 23:
return p j s.t. j = H ash(ν ) mod |Π | 24: upon receiving "coinShare, sq, ρ" from p j do 25:
if share-validate(sq, p j , ρ) then 26:
S coin ← S coin ∪ {ρ } progress. We describe the help&tryHalting procedure in the next section. For space limitation we omit the description of the Barrier and Leader-election primitives (Algorithm 7), which can be found in [25] .
Communication complexity. The communication cost of the Barrier and Leader-election primitives, as well as that of n LBV instances, is O(n 2 ), which brings us to a total of O(n 2 ) cost for every wave. Since every wave have a probability of 1/3 to choose a completed LBV, the protocol operates 3 waves in expectation. Therefore, since the communication cost of state exchange and help&tryHalting is O(n 2 ) as well, we get that the total cost, in expectation, is O(n 2 ) words.
Optimal optimistic protocol: combine the pieces
In this section we combine the pieces of our optimal optimistic byzantine agreement protocol. In a high level, parties first optimistically try the synchronous protocol (of section 4.2), then invoke help&tryHalting and continue to the asynchronous fallback (of section 4.3) in case a decision has not been reached. A pseudocode is given in Algorithm 8
and an illustration appears in Figure 5 .
One of the biggest challenges in designing protocols with several paths is to make sure that safety is always preserved a crossed them, meaning that parties must never decide differently even if they decide in different parts of the protocol.
In our protocol, however, this is inherently not a concern. Since both parts use the linear LBV as a building block, we get safety for free -if we look on an execution of our protocol in retrospect and ignore all LBVs that were not elected in the asynchronous part, then the LBV instances in the synchronous part together with the elected ones in the asynchronous part form a sequential composition, which satisfies the Agreement property.
Algorithm 8 Optimistic byzantine agreement: protocol for a party p i .
tryOptimistic() 4: help&tryHalting(n + 1) ▷ Blocking invocation 5:
fallback(n + 2)
On the other hand, satisfying termination without sacrificing optimal adaptive complexity is a non-trivial challenge.
Parties start the protocol by optimistically trying the synchronous part, but unfortunately, at the end of the synchronous part they cannot distinguish between the case in which the communication was indeed synchronous and all honest parties decided and the case in which some honest parties did not decide due to asynchrony. Moreover, honest parties cannot distinguish between honest parties that did not decide and thus wish to continue to the asynchronous fallback part and byzantine parties that want to move to the fallback part in order to increase the communication cost.
To this end, we implement the help&tryHalting procedure, which stops honest parties from moving to the fallback part in synchronous runs, with a communication cost of O(f t) words. The idea is to help parties learn the decision value and move to the fallback part only when the number of help request indicates that the run is asynchronous.
The pseudocode of help&tryHalting is given in Algorithm 9 and an illustration appears in Figure 6 . Each honest party that have not yet decided sends a singed helpReqest to all other parties. When an honest party gets an helpReqest, the party replies with its COMMIT value, but if it gets t + 1 helpReqest messages, the party combines them to a threshold signature and sends it in a complain message to all. When an honest party gets a complain message, it echos it to all parties and continues to the fallback part.
Algorithm 9 Help and try halting: Procedure for a party p i .
Local variables initialization:
S help = { }; HALT ← t r ue
send "helpReqest, sq, ρ" to all parties 5:
wait until HALT = false 6: upon receiving "helpReply, sq, commit" do 7: check&updateCommit(commit) 8 : upon receiving "helpReqest, sq, ρ" from a party p j do 9:
if share-validate( ⟨helpReqest, sq ⟩, p j , ρ) then 10:
S help ← S help ∪ {ρ } 11:
send "helpReply, sq, COMMIT" to p j 12:
if |S help | = t + 1 then 13:
ν ← threshold-sign(S help ) 14: send "complain, sq, ν " to all parties 15: upon receiving "complain, sq, ν " do 16:
if threshold-validate( ⟨helpReqst, sq ⟩, ν ) then 17:
send "complain, sq, ν " to all parties 18:
HALT ← false (a) A few helpRequest messages -help and halt. (b) Too much helpRequest messages -the run is asynchronous, move to the fallback part. Fig. 6 . An illustration of the help&tryHalting procedure.
Termination. Consider two cases. First, the parties move to the fallback part, in which case (standard) termination is guaranteed in eventually synchronous runs and probabilistic termination is guaranteed in asynchronous runs.
Otherwise, less then t + 1 parties send helpReqest in help&tryHalting, which implies that at least t + 1 honest parties decided and had a commit certificate before invoking help&tryHalting. Therefore, all honest parties that did not decide before invoking help&tryHalting eventually get a helpReply message with a commit certificate and decide as well.
Communuication complexity. The synchronous (optimistic) part guarantees that if the run is indeed synchronous, then all honest parties decide before invoking help&tryHalting. The help&tryHalting procedure guarantees that parties continue to the fallback part only if t + 1 parties send an helpReqest message, which implies that they move only if at least one honest party has not decided in the synchronous part. Therefore, together they guarantee that honest parties never move to the fallback part in synchronous runs.
The communication complexity of the synchronous part is O(f t +t), so in order to show that the total communication cost of the protocol in synchronous runs is O(f t +t) we need to show that the cost of help&tryHalting is O(f t +t) as well.
Since in synchronous runs all honest parties decide in the synchronous part, they do not send helpReqest messages, and thus no party can send a valid complain message. Each byzantine party that does send helpReqest messages can cause honest parties to send O(t) replies, which implies a total communication cost of O(f t) in synchronous runs.
As for all other runs, Theorem 1 states that deterministic protocols have an unbounded communication cost in the worst case. Thanks to the randomized fallback, our protocol has a communication cost of O(t 2 ) in expectation.
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper we propose a new approach to design agreement algorithms for SMR systems. Instead of designing deterministic protocols for the eventually synchronous model, which we prove cannot guarantee bounded communication cost before GST, we propose to abandon eventual synchrony and design protocols that are optimized for the synchronous case but also have a randomized fallback to deal with asynchrony. Traditionally, most SMR solutions avoid randomized asynchronous protocols due to their complexity and high communication cost. We, in contrast, argue that this communication cost is reasonable given that the alternative is an unbounded communication cost during the wait for eventual synchrony.
We present the first optimistic protocol that has communication complexity of O(f t + t) in synchronous runs and O(t 2 ), in expectation, in non-synchronous runs. To strengthen our result, we prove that no deterministic protocol can do better in synchronous runs. As for asynchronous runs, the lower bound in [2] proves that O(t 2 ) is optimal in the worst case of f = t. Note that the lower bounds are proven for a static adversary, whereas our protocol can withstand an adaptive one. From a practical point of view, our synchronous part can tolerate "short" periods of asynchronyevery LBV instance that is executed during the asynchronous periods is treated in the analysis as if its leader is faulty.
Future work. First, as mentioned in the introduction, our synchronous protocol satisfies early decision but not early stopping. Therefore, the question of optimal adaptive communication cost together with early stooping remains open. Second, it may be possible to improve our protocol's complexity even further. In particular, the lower bound on communication cost in synchronous runs applies only to deterministic algorithms, so it might be possible to circumvent it via randomization. In addition, the quadratic communication cost of the asynchronous fallback might also be improved in runs with f < t since the lower bound assumes the worst-case scenario.
A FOR THE LOWER BOUNDS
We prove here Claim 1, which is given in Section 3 without a proof. Claim 1. The synchronous communication cost with 0 failures of any byzantine agreement algorithm is at least t.
Proof. Assume by a way of contradiction such algorithm A with less communication cost with 0 failures and consider a run r ∈ R s 0 of A in which all parties propose 1. By the Termination and Binary validity properties, all parties decide 1 in r . By the contradicting assumption there are at least 2t + 1 honest parties that get no messages in r . Now consider anther run r ′ ∈ R s 0 of A in which all parties propose 0, and again, by the contradicting assumption, at least 2t + 1 honest parties that get no messages in r ′ . Thus, there is at least one honest party p that gets no messages in both runs and thus cannot distinguish between r and r ′ . Therefore, p decides 1 in run r ′ as well. A contradiction to the Binary validity property. □
B A CORRECTNESS PROOF OF OUR OPTIMISTIC BYZANTINE AGREEMENT PROTOCOL
In this section we prove the correctness of our optimistic byzantine agreement protocol from Section 4.
B.1 Safety.
We start by proving that our sequential composition of the linear LBV building block is safe. In a sequential composition parties sequentially invoke LBV instances s.t. for every LBV in the sequence they first invoke startView and use the local state variables, then, at some point they invoke wedgeView and update the local state with the returned values and move to the next LBV. Lemma 3 . If a party p gets a commit certificate for value v from an LBV instance with sequence number sq, then the local LOCK variable of at least n − 2t honest parties is at least sq when they start the LBV instance with sequence number sq + 1.
Proof. To generate a commit certificate, a party needs n − t commitShare signatures. In addition, honest parties wedge an LBV instance before moving to the next one in sequential compositions. Thus, at least n − 2t honest parties sent their commitShare in the LBV with sq before starting the LBV with sq + 1. The lemma follows since parties set their lockProof before sending their commitShare and update their LOCK variable accordingly before invoking the next LBV. □
The next corollary follows from Lemma 3 and the fact that the local LOCK variables are never decreased in our sequential compositions.
Corollary 4. If a party p gets a commit certificate for value v from an LBV instance with sequence number sq, then there at least n − 2t honest parties which LOCK variable is at least sq when they start any LBV with sequence number sq ′ > sq. Lemma 5 . It is impossible to generate two commit certificates for different values from the same LBV instance.
Proof. In every LBV instance, to generate a commit certificate for a value v at least n − t parties need to send a valid commitShare for value v. Therefore, to generate generate two commit certificates for different values from the same LBV instance we need at least 1 honest party need to send two contradicting commitShare message, which is impossible by the code. □
The next lemma shows that after some party generates a commit certificate for a value v it is impossible to generate a valid key with different value. Lemma 6 . Assume some honest party p gets a commit certificate for value v from an LBV instance with sequence number sq. Than no party can get a valid keyProof on a value other than v from an LBV instance with sequence number sq ′ ≥ sq in a sequential composition.
Proof. We prove by induction on LBVs' sequence numbers. Base: Sequence number sq. To generate a commit certificate for value v at least n − 2t honest parties need to generate a commitShare signature. An honest party generates a commitShare signature only if it gets a valid lockStep message with value v, which in turn requires at least n − 2t honest parties to generate lockShare signatures on v An honest party generates a lockShare signature on v only of it gets a valid keyStep message with value v, which in turn requires at least n − t parties to generate keyShare signatures on v. Thus, if some party gets a commit certificate for value v from an LBV instance with sequence number sq, then n − t parties previously generated keyShare signatures on v in this LBV instance. Moreover, since honest parties never generate keyShare signatures on different values, we get that it is impossible to generate two valid keyStep messages with different values. The lemma follows.
step: Assume the lemma holds for all LBVs with sequence number sq ′′ , sq ≤ sq ′′ ≤ sq ′ , we now show that it holds for sq ′ + 1 as well. Assume by a way of contradiction that some party gets a valid keyProof with value v ′ v from the LBV with sequence number sq + 1. Thus, at least n − t parties generated keyShare signatures on v ′ in the LBV with sq + 1. By Lemma 3 , there are at least n − 2t honest parties whose local LOCK ≥ sq in the LBV with sq + 1. Thus, since n ≥ 3t + 1, we get that at least 1 honest party p whose local LOCK ≥ sq generated keyShare signatures on v ′ in the LBV with sq + 1. Therefore, p gets a valid KEY for v ′ with a sequence number sq ′′ ≥ sq. A contradiction to the inductive assumption. □ Lemma 7. Our optimistic byzantine agreement protocol, which is given in Algorithms 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, satisfies the Agreement property.
Proof. Our protocol sequential composes LBV instances and decides only on values with a commit certificate. So we need to show that it is impossible to generate two commit certificates for different values in a sequential composition of LBV instances. Let party p be the first to generate a commit certificate for some value v and let sq be the sequence number of the LBV instance in which it was generated. By lemma 5, it is impossible to generate a commit certificate for a value other then v in the LBV with sequence number sq. By Lemma 6 , no party can get a valid keyProof on a value other than v from an LBV instance with sequence number sq ′ ≥ sq. By Lemma 5, the local LOCK variable of at least n − 2t honest parties is at least sq in any LBV after the one with sequence number sq. Therefore, the lemma follows from the fact that at least n − t parties need to contribute signatures in order to generate a commit certificate and since an honest party whose LOCK ≥ sq will not generate a keyShare signature on a value v ′ without getting a valid KEY for v ′ from an LBV with sequence number sq ′ ≥ sq. □
B.2 Liveness.
We now prove that our protocol satisfies termination in all synchronous and eventually synchronous runs and provide probabilistic termination in all asynchronous runs. Lemma 8 . Consider an LBV instance lbv in a sequential composition. If some honest party p is locked on a sequence number sq (its LOCK = sq) before starting lbv, then at least n − 2t honest parties set their local KEY variable with a valid key and sequence number sq immediately after wedging the LBV instance with sq.
Proof. Since p is locked on sq, then it got a valid lockStep message in the LBV instance with sequence number sq. To generate a valid lockStep, a party needs n − t lockShare signatures. Thus, since honest parties first wedge an LBV instance and then update their local state with the returned values, we get that at least n − 2t honest parties generated a lockShare signature before updating their local KEY variable. Thus, at least n − 2t honest parties got a valid keyProof before wedging and thus update their local KEY variable accordingly immediately after wedging. □ Lemma 9. Consider a synchronous run of our protocol, and consider an LBV instance lbv in the synchronous part, which parties invoke at time t. If the leader of lbv is honest and it have not decided before time t, then all honest parties decide at time t + 7∆.
Proof. First, by Lemma 8 and since parties overwrite their local KEY variables only with more up-to-date keys, we get that at least n − 2t honest parties has a KEY variable that unlocks all honest parties (it's sequence number is equal to or higher than all honest parties' LOCK) variable). By the code, the leader query all parties for their KEY and waits for n − 2t replays. Thus, it gets a reply from at least 1 honest party that have a key that unlocks all honest parties. Therefore, the leader learn this key and thus gets all honest parties to participates. The lemma follows from synchrony and the fact that all honest parties start lbv at the same time and and do not wedge before all honest parties get al messages. □ Lemma 10. All honest parties decide in all synchronous runs of the protocol.
Proof. Assume by a way of contradiction that some honest party p does not decide. Let lbv be an LBV instance in the synchronous part in which p is the leader. By Lemma 9, all honest parties decide at the end of lbv. A contradiction. □ Lemma 11. If t + 1 honest parties decide in the synchronous part of a run of our optimistic protocol, then all honest parties eventually decide.
Proof. By the code of the help&tryHalting procedure, any party p that does not decide in the synchronous part of the protocol sends an help request to all parties and waits for n − t to reply. Since t + 1 honest parties decided in the synchronous part before invoking help&tryHalting, then p gets a valid commit certificate and decides as well. □ Lemma 12. If less than t + 1 honest parties decide in the synchronous part of a run of our optimistic protocol, then all honest parties eventually move to the asynchronous fallback part.
Proof. Since less than t + 1 honest parties decided before invoking help&tryHalting, than at least t + 1 honest parties send an helpReqest message to all other parties. Thus all honest parties eventually get t + 1 help replay, combine them to a complain message, send it to all other parties, and move to the fallback part.
